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ABSTRACT 
This note presents a formula for the equilibrium ratio 
of the number of urban job seekers to the number of formal sector 
jobs when a non-competitive vjag'e differential is maintained between 
the wage in the formal sector and earnings elsewhere in the economy. 
The loss of national product due to the wage differential is also 
examined. The loss attributable to the misallocation of labor is 
accentuated by the incentive which a high urban wage gives for 
wasteful job-seeking. 
Note on Search Unemployment and Wage Differentials 
The.purpose of this note is to present a formula for the 
equilibrium ratio of the number of urban job-seekers U to the number of 
formal sector jobs J. It will be seen that this ratio depends on, among 
other things, the differential between the formal sector wage and earnings 
in agriculture. The social loss attributable to this wage differential 
can also be calculated. 
In the modern or formal sector the number of jobs J is increasing 
continuously at a proportional rate n per year. Also, job-holders vacate 
their jobs, because of death, disability, or retirement, at a proportional 
rate of q per year. It is assumed that at the substantial income differentials 
with which we are here concerned, there are no other voluntary or involuntary 
withdrawals from lucrative formal employment. The same factor, q per year, 
applies to economic mortality in agriculture and informal employment. 
The annual wage in the formal sector is y. the earnings per year 
in agriculture z, and the earnings per year of the unemployed in the urban 
informal sector x. We will denote ^ / as y (>1) and x/ as u>(<1). The z z 
relative wage differential u we take as a datum, determined by trade union 
bargaining power and political strength, by government policy, and by the 
acquiescence of the large international firms of the modern sector. 
The central idea is that the number of job-seekers U adjusts until 
the expected value of urban income is equal to rural income. The expected 
value of urban income is a weighted average of income with a formal job 
and income without a formal job, the weights depending on the probability 
of getting one. That probability depends inversely on U. Urban-rural 
migration keeps U at the level where life prospects are equal in city and 
county. 
The implementation of this simple idea is somewhat complicated, 
but the essential formula may be obtained as follows: 
1. It is easier to deal in continuous time rather than discrete 
time. Thus we shall assume that people in the unemployment pool U at time 
t are continuously getting jobs at a rate of p per annum. In the short 
period of time dt3 the number of placements in jobs is pUdt. From what 
was earlier assumed, it is also (n+q)Jdt. Therefore, 
(1) p = (ntq)J . 
U 
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2. With a constant p, what is the probability that an individual 
in the unemployment pool at time zero will still be unemployed at time t? 
The answer is e Ignoring new migrants, the original pool declines in 
size at a steady rate of attrition p. No matter how many of the original 
group are left, no matter how long the unemployed have been waiting, their 
chances of getting a job in the next instant remain the same. So the 
probability that an individual remains unemployed until time t and gets 
a job in the instant between t and t+dt is pe ^  dt. 
3. We assume that all incomes y,z,x are growing at an exponential 
rate y, thanks to general technological progress. Our typical individual 
takes this .growth into account, but he also discounts future incomes of all 
kinds by a rate r, For familiar theoretical reasons we do not explain here 
r is taken to be larger, or at least no le:sss than n+y, the natural rate of 
growth of the economy. The typical individual also discounts future incomes 
by his survival chances. Here it does no harm, but greatly simplifies 
algebra, to make the biologically unrealistic assumption that economic 
mortality occurs probabilistically like exponential depreciation. The 
probability of sheer survival for a length of time t is e and the 
probability of economic death during the next instant is q dt, independent 
of the previous length of life. 
4. Let us now calculate the present value of an individual who joins 
the urban labor pool at time zero and gets a job at time t. It is: 
t °° , -(r+q-yju ^ , -(r+q-y)u, , s Jxe du + J ye du 
o t 
= x(l-e-(r^-Y)t) + y(e' ( r^ Y ) t) 
r + q - y r + q - y 
The probability that this happens is, as we have seen, pe ^  
So the expected value of the present value of urban income is 
CO 
' u - e ' ^ ^ e - ^ d t +py /-(n-rq-y)t + r + q - y o -J-d- e ^ -pt ,. 
(3) r + q _ Y o 6 d t 
_gx + p (y-x) 
r + q - y) p (r+q-y)(r+q-y+p) 
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This must be, in equilibrium, equal to the present value of staying the 
country, namely ^ + ^ _ ^  
This gives the basic equation; 
p(y-x) —- z - x, or r + q - y + P 
py - px = (r + q - y)(z - X) + pz - px, or 
(4) 
p = (r + q - y). z - x 
v - z 
Putting (4) together with the definition (1) of p in terms of 
U and J, we have 
(5) £ _ n + q y - z _ n + q y - 1 
J r + q ~ Y z - x r + q - Y * l ~ w 
5. From (5) can be derived some interesting implications. 
The unemployment rate, in terms of formal jobs, is (a) greater the larger 
is formal wage, relative to agricultural income, (b) greater the larger is 
income while unemployed, relative to agricultural income, (c) greater the 
faster the rate of job creation in the formal sector. 
This last implication may appear paradoxical, as it would seem 
intuitively that a rapid expansion of J is the eventual solution to the 
unemployment problem. Of course it is, in the long run sense that if J 
grows faster than the labor force eventually everyone will be employed in 
the modern sector. But in the long intermediate run, before the traditional 
rural sector is ecompletely phased out, there will be unemployment, and it 
will be a larger rather than smaller fraction of J the faster J is growing. 
The unemployment problem can only be alleviated if expansion of 
J is accompanied by a reduction of the wage differential y - z. 
6. Let us consider now the loss of national product due to the wage 
differential. This loss arises from the fact that the marginal product of 
labor is kept higher in the modern sector than in agriculture, and also 
higher than the marginal product of informal urban underemployment. 
Society would gain by shifting labor until the marginal products are equated, 
or until all labor is moved out of occupations with lower marginal product. 
For convenience of illustration, assume the marginal product in 
agriculture is constant at z. This implies that agricultural output is not 
limited in any degree by shortage of land or other cooperating factors, a 
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situation that may be approximated in the subsistence agricultural sectors 
of many developing economies. Likewise assume the marginal product of 
informal urban employment is constant at x. 
In the modern sector, however, the marginal product of labor varies 
inversely with the amount of employment. Specifically, let output Q of 
<x . rc-l 
modern sector be J , so that marginal productivity is <T . We are to 
compare two situations: the optimum with output Q* and employment J*, against 
the alternative with output Q and employment J; The relevant comparisons are 
as follows: 
Table 1 
Optimum Alternative 
jVcc-l modern wage « J = z <= J = yz 1 
it 1 ~ <*-T modern employment J = j - (yz) 
„ ( 
modern output Q = (z) Q = (yz)g-l 
(«) 1 ( «) >i . cc — 1 ^  J = (i) 1 J 
_ CC— 1 
Q = (1) Q 
unemployment 0 U = X yi-1 J 
1-w 
output of unemployed X y-1 Jx = X y-1 Jo)z 
1-0) l-o) 
output of agriculture ( N - J ) z ( N - J - U ) z 
total output (I1)CC"1Q + Nz - (1)" 1 Jz Q + Nz - Jz + X y-1 JZ(OJ-I) 
(U) (V) l-o) 
z = J , Jz : 11 Q 
total output « 1 
optimum (-)CC_1Q - Q - Q + - Q + X (y-l)« Q 
u y y U y 
less alternative 
« 1 
= Q " ~ 1 + * + A (y-1)- .j 
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For examplej take the following values of the parameters: 
1 1 13 * ® = g-j u z 1 + ,A = 2', The difference in output is Q, 
Figure 1 shows graphically the qualitative nature of the social loss. 
7. The calculation would be modified if realized net incomes in the 
three categories differed from marginal productivities. This would happen 
if, for example, high wage workers were taxed to pay transfers to their 
less fortunate countrymen, or if they were informally taxed to help less 
fortunate kinsmen. Transfers to unemployed raise the attractiveness of 
membership in the .urban labor force. They increase the amount of unemploy-
ment and therefore add to the social loss due to income differentials. 
Transfers to agriculture, on the other hand, diminish the amount of 
unemployment and therefore mitigate the social loss. 
It is possible, but tedious, to work out these modifications for 
any specified transfer system. For example, suppose that high-wage 
beneficiaries are taxed sufficiently to narrow their differential advantage 
over the rest of the population by Suppose also that u (which now 
becomes relevant) is 5, and that in the alternative situation agricultural 
employment is 10 times modern employment. The social gain from moving to 
the optimum is g ^ Q instead of —• Q (=Z|| Q). 
8. It is also possible to introduce the possibility of monopoly in 
the modern sector, so that the wage rate there is only a fraction of marginal 
Acc-l product. Suppose this fraction is f, so that z = f J = f«J , 
U 
None of the other calculations in Table 1 are affected. 
All we need to do is to substitute f«/ for */ in the bottom line. If f 
11^ ^ ^ 26 " were 5 , this would add — Q to the original illustrative calculations of — Q. Ho ~ 
The reason for an additive correction is that with monopoly the 
wage differential understates the differential of marginal productivities. 
Every marginal shift of labor increases output by more than the wage differential. 
A further gain could be made by eliminating monopoly, of course. 
Although the existence of monopoly in the modern sector may be an argument 
offered for union and government support of high wages in that sector, high 
wages are not an effective way to cancel the effect of monopoly. Instead 
they pile one monopoly on to another, and in a sense make modern employers 
and employees joint monopolists at the expense of the rest of the populace. 
The proper' antidote to monopoly is competitions either from new domestic 
firms or from imports. 
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9. It should be emphasized that this note is an exercise in comparative 
statics. The ratio y calculated here is an equilibrium ratio. The dynamics 
of migration between county and city have not been specified or studied, 
and it is possible that on some dynamic assumptions the equilibrium is not 
stable. On this subject the reader should consult the well known work of 
Todaro and a forthcoming paper by Richard Porter of IDS. 
